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“At bottom, [TC HEARTLAND] is nothing more than a
request for an ill-conceived, one-size-fits-all judicial end-run
around existing legislative policy decisions.”1
— Amicus Curiae, The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA)

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2016, Martin Shkreli visited Capitol Hill.2 As CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals, Shkreli faced Congressional pressure for Turing’s purchase of
an old drug, Daraprim, and the company’s decision to hike the price from $13.50
to $750 per dose.3 Though headlines focused on Shkreli’s newfound infamy as
“PhRMA Bro,” the underlying issue “ha[d] as much to do with the Food and
Drug Administration as Shkreli: although the drug’s patent expired in the
nineteen-fifties, the F.D.A. certification process for generic drugs is grueling
enough that, for the moment, whoever owns Daraprim has a virtual monopoly
in America.”4 In short, Shkreli’s company could increase Daraprim’s price as
high as they wished because the FDA approval process for a generic was so
onerous to initiate that, even though Daraprim’s patent expired years ago, the
drug faced no competition.5
The Daraprim saga is far from unique. As of October 30, 2017, the FDA
announced that at least 319 pharmaceutical drugs in the United States had
expired patents but no generic competitor.6 Lomustine, a forty-year-old drug
used to treat multiple types of cancer, was purchased by NextSource
1 Brief of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Groups Brands LLC,
137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
2 Haley Sweetland Edwards, Pharma ‘Bad Boy’ Martin Shkreli Mocks Congress, TIME (Feb. 4,
2016), time.com/4207931/martin-shkreli-congress-turning-pharmaceutical-hearing/.
3 Jordan Weissmann, How the Government Could Punish That Hedge Fund Bro Who Wanted to
Raise a Drug’s Price 5,000 Percent, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Sept. 23, 2015, 8:48 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/09/23/martin_shkreli_and_daraprim_how_
the_government_could_stop_his_drug_price.html.
4 Kelefa Sanneh, Everyone Hates Martin Shkreli. Everyone Is Missing the Point, NEW YORKER
(Feb. 5, 2016), https: //www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/everyone-hatesmartin-shkreli-everyone-is-missing-the-point.
5 Weismann, supra note 3.
6 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIST OF OFF-PATENT, OFF-EXCLUSIVITY DRUGS WITHOUT
AN APPROVED GENERIC (2017).
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Biotechnology in 2013; between 2013 and 2017, the price increased 1,400
percent.7 The company justified the pricing increase based on “productdevelopment costs, regulatory-agency fees, and the benefit the treatment delivers
to patients.”8 Normally, massive price increases for an off-patent drug
(regardless of their justification) would encourage generic competition, but
generic drug manufacturers have been deterred by “big entry costs and time
commitments associated with obtaining regulatory approval” by the FDA.9
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, or HatchWaxman Act,10 was designed in order to ensure healthy competition between
branded and generic pharmaceuticals and prevent companies like Turing and
NextSource from engaging in price gouging.11 Signed into law in 1984, the
Hatch-Waxman Act was drafted with two “competing goals in mind: to spur new
pharmaceutical development and to encourage greater public access to generic
drugs.”12
Periods of market exclusivity were given to brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturers,13 while their generic competitors were given
expedited review of their FDA application for approval to enter the market. 14
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act was at first successful in balancing the
interests of these two groups, in recent years, the FDA’s slow approval process
has deterred generic pharmaceutical corporations from entering the market to
compete with brand-name companies.15
In March 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court unwittingly backed into a solution
that mitigates the impact of the FDA’s problematic approval process. In TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,16 the Supreme Court turned a

7 Peter Loftus, Cancer Drug Price Rises 1,400% With No Generic to Challenge It, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cancer-drug-price-rises-1400-withno-generic-to-challenge-it-1514203201.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). The Act’s common name, the Hatch-Waxman
Act, is derived from the original sponsors of the bill as introduced in Congress, Senator Orrin
Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman.
11 David Crow, Waxman hits out at Allergan patent deal with Mohawk tribe, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/81bd8930-abb8-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130 (quoting
Henry Waxman as saying that “[w]hen drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Senator Hatch and I
worked hard to find a balance that would promote price competition while providing at the
same time incentives for manufacturers”).
12 Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and
Generic Drug Competition, 10 CURRENT TOPICS ON MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 1950 (2010).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Currently, 80% of American prescriptions are for generic drugs. However, drug prices
have increased massively in recent years. Weissmann, supra note 3.
16 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
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long-standing interpretation of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400, on its
head. Part (b) of the statute provides that a patent suit “may be brought in the
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.”17 For the twenty-seven years prior to TC Heartland, U.S. courts had
followed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 1400(b), thereby gifting the
court the moniker “de facto supreme court of patents.”18 The Federal Circuit
interpreted the statute’s reference to a defendant’s residence expansively, finding
venue proper anywhere the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.19
Doing so gave extensive “flexibility to pharmaceutical companies . . . bringing
Hatch-Waxman cases,”20 so Hatch-Waxman suits were filed almost exclusively
in Delaware and New Jersey, where most branded pharmaceutical companies
were incorporated.21
Though plaintiffs’ “forum-selection flexibility”22 lasted nearly thirty years, in
TC Heartland, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and limited a
corporation’s residence to “the state of incorporation only”23 by relying on a
narrower 1957 interpretation of § 1400(b) in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products
Corp.24 As a result, the TC Heartland decision led patent plaintiffs to rely on the
second prong of § 1400(b), where a defendant commits “acts of infringement”

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016).
Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387,
387 (2001).
19 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017); see
also Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62, 63 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A] corporation now is a resident
of a district if it is subject to personal jurisdiction in that district.”); Braden Shielding Sys. v.
Shielding Dynamics, 812 F. Supp. 819, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“To the extent that Fourco and
VE Holding conflict, we must favor VE Holding . . .”); Hester Industries Inc. v. Stein Inc., No.
96-719-A, 1996 WL 710835, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1996) (“[T]he standards for personal
jurisdiction and venue involve weighing the same elements . . .”); Pfizer Inc. v. Synthon
Holding, B.V., 386 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“The Federal Circuit holds that a
defendant ‘resides’ in a district if it is subject to personal jurisdiction there.”).
20 Paul A. Ainsworth & Joshua I. Miller, Practical Issues for the Pharmaceutical and
Biopharmaceutical Industry in the Wake of TC Heartland, NAT’L L. REV. 1, 1(May 23, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/practical-issues-pharmaceutical-andbiopharmaceutical-industry-wake-tc-heartland (citing VE Holding Corp.., 917 F.2d at 1574).
21 The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Implications for Hatch-Waxman Litigation, ARENT
FOX LLP (May 25, 2017), https://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/supremecourt%E2%80%99s-tc-heartland-decision-implications-hatch-waxman-litigation.
22 Ainsworth, supra note 20, at 2.
23 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017).
24 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957).
17
18
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and has a “regular and established place of business,”25 in order to find a proper
venue. For Hatch-Waxman litigants, relying on the second prong of § 1400(b)
created an “impenetrable problem”26 because “the unique [forward-looking]
posture of pharmaceutical litigation”27 contradicts the “backward-looking,
historical conduct” 28 of § 1400(b)’s second prong. District courts since TC
Heartland have split when considering how to resolve this issue and apply the
second prong of § 1400(b) in the Hatch-Waxman context, 29 leaving brand-name
pharmaceutical plaintiffs uncertain as to where they can sue their generic
competitors.30 Thus, though “venue decisions . . . can be essential for both
plaintiffs and defendants,”31 litigation since TC Heartland “bodes well for
defendants (accused infringers) seeking to defend patent cases on their home turf
or otherwise seeking a more favorable forum”32 because of the newfound
difficulty for pharmaceutical plaintiffs in finding a proper venue.
Branded pharmaceutical companies urge that TC Heartland disrupts the
“carefully crafted balance[ ]” in the Hatch-Waxman Act and “serves no purpose
except to invite harassment, enable and encourage inconsistent results, and waste
the innovator’s time and resources.”33 Nevertheless, this Note argues that the
newfound difficulty TC Heartland imposes on branded pharmaceutical
companies reinforces the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act by restoring market
25 See OptoLum, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. CV-16-03828-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 3130642, at *1
(D. Ariz. July 24, 2017) (finding that TC Heartland “made clear that a corporation ‘resides’ only
in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute”); see also Boston Sci.
Corp. v. Cook Grp., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 244 (D. Del. 2017) (Noting that after TC
Heartland, “the issue of how to determine what is and is not a regular and established place of
business is arising before courts with increased frequency.”).
26 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at
*6 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
27 Christina A. Ondrick et al., U.S. Supreme Court Limits Venue Under the Patent Statute in TC
Heartland, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (May 23, 2017), https://www.paulhastings.com/publicationsitems/details/?id=9a75ec69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
28 Bristol-Myers, No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *7.
29 Compare Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *7, with Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793, at *1, *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17,
2017).
30 Scott W. Doyle et al., What is a ‘Regular and Established Place of Business?, FRIED FRANK LLP
(July 10, 2017), http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7812.
31 Jake Holdreith et al., New Strategies for Venue in Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 13 PLIR 372, 374,
Mar. 13, 2015 (arguing that delays in the disposition of venue suits are harmful to generic
manufacturers: “even when a generic ultimately wins on the merits, if the resolution takes too
long, it can effectively be a win for the brand”).
32 Franklin D. Kang & Lyle D. Kossis, Federal Circuit Issues First Published Decision Applying
High Court’s T.C. Heartland Decision Regarding Patent Venue, MCGUIREWOODS: LEGAL ALERT
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2017/9/
Federal-Circuit-Published-Decision-TC-Heartland-Patent-Venue.aspx.
33 Brief of PhRMA supra note 1, at *2–4.
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competition. To do so, Part Two of this Note will examine the maturity of the
patent venue provision, § 1400(b) and the development of the Supreme Court’s
decision in TC Heartland. In Part Three, this Note will analyze the options
available to pharmaceutical plaintiffs to clarify confusion in patent infringement
suits, including filing a protective suit, requesting consolidation through
multidistrict litigation, and encouraging Congressional action. This Note finds
the first two solutions untenable due to their high cost, and ultimately argues that
Congress’s failure to act is beneficial in the pharmaceutical context because, by
making it more difficult for pharmaceutical plaintiffs to file suit, generic
manufacturers are once again able to enter the market and compete with brandname manufacturers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. NARROW BEGINNINGS

1. Creation of the Patent Venue Statute. As the Supreme Court notes at the
beginning of TC Heartland,34 the continually-changing, century-long history of
patent venue provisions is crucial to parse the language of the present statute.
Congress first enacted a venue statute specific to patents in 189735 and put patent
infringement cases “in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue
legislation.”36 For the next forty-five years, courts interpreted the patent-specific
venue statute to be the exclusive provision governing venue for patent
infringement suits,37 whereby suits could be filed in the district where the
defendant was an “inhabitant” or in the district where the defendant “committed
acts of infringement” and had a “regular and established place of business.”38 In
1942, the Supreme Court justified its continued adherence to the exclusivity of
the patent venue provision by arguing that its purpose in defining the exact
jurisdictional parameters would be undermined if the provision was interpreted
to “dovetail with the general [venue] provisions.”39
In 1948, Congress “re-codified” the statute as § 1400(b) and replaced the
word “inhabit[s]” with the word “resides.”40 Separately, the 1948 Act also
34 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2017) (“The
history of the relevant statutes provides important context for the issue in this case.”).
35 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
36 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972).
37 See Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942) (determining that
§ 1400 “is the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings”).
38 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
39 315 U.S. at 566.
40 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518–19 (2017)
(citing Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 936).
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established § 1391, the general venue statute,41 which defines corporate residence
“for venue purposes” broadly as “any judicial district in which [the corporation]
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business . . . “42
Although intended to eliminate confusion about venue in patent
infringement suits, re-codification only muddied the waters and created a circuit
split43 because courts were unclear whether the new use of “resides” in § 1400(b)
fell under the definition of “residence” in § 1391(c).44 To resolve the split, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1957 in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products
Corp. and examined whether § 1400(b) was the “sole and exclusive provision
controlling venue in patent infringement actions.”45
2. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Fourco. In Fourco, the Supreme Court
considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue provision, was
“supplemented” by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), the general patent statute.46 Transmirra
sued Fourco, a West Virginia corporation, in the Southern District of New York
for patent infringement.47 Transmirra alleged that Fourco resided in the
Southern District of New York for venue purposes because it was “actively
inducing infringement” of Transmirra’s patented invention by “making, selling
or using television receivers, television cathode ray receiving tubes or other
devices . . . within the Southern District of New York.”48 In finding that Fourco
had not demonstrated the requisite acts of infringement in S.D.N.Y., the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the general venue provision
supplemented § 1400(b) and found that patent infringement suits could be
brought exclusively in either “the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and

41 See id. at 1519 (noting that when Congress “recodified the patent venue statute . . . [it]
also enacted the general venue statute”).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).
43 See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 224 n.3 (1957) (finding
that “[t]he Third Circuit, in Ackerman v. Hook, 183 F.2d 11, the Seventh Circuit in C-O-Two Fire
Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410, and the Tenth Circuit, in Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Company,
225 F.2d 572, as well as numerous District Courts, have held that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) alone
controls venue in patent infringement cases, while, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in
Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469, and in Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205 F.2d
660, and several District Courts, have held that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) are to be
read into, and as supplementing, § 1400(b), as the Second Circuit held in this case, and that,
hence, a corporation may be sued for patent infringement in any district where it merely ‘is
doing business’ ”).
44 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1519.
45 Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229.
46 Id. at 222.
47 Id. at 223.
48 Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 133 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
rev’d 353 U.S. 222 (1957)).
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established place of business.”49 In other words, patent venue under § 1400(b)
is more restrictive than the general § 1391 venue provision. Crucially, the Fourco
Court based its argument on its interpretation of Congressional intent: the Court
relied on the distinction between the “general language” of § 1391(c) and the
“specific terms” of § 1400(b)50 to decide that § 1391(c) did not control because
“nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced [congressional] intent to alter that
status.”51
B. PATENT VENUE EXPANSION

In 1988, Congress amended § 1391 and altered the statutory language relied
on by the Supreme Court in Fourco.52
1. The 1988 Amendment. At the time Fourco was decided, § 1391(c) ended with
the qualifier “for venue purposes.”53 The 1988 amendment split the statute into
two sentences54 and established new “exact and classic language.”55 The new
language made it clear that “for purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject
to personal jurisdiction . . . “56 Though the Supreme Court was silent on the issue,
the Federal Circuit in 1990 found that the 1988 amendment broadened the scope
of § 1391(c) to incorporate the definition of residence in § 1400(b), thus
rendering § 1400(b) meaningless.57
2. The Federal Circuit’s Ruling in VE Holding. In 1990, the Federal Circuit in
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. found that a corporate defendant
resided anywhere it was subject to personal jurisdiction.58 The Federal Circuit
seized what they viewed to be an open door to reformulate case law on patent
infringement59 and justified its departure from Fourco by relying on the 1988
Fourco, 353 U.S. at 228–29.
Id. (“Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which
otherwise might be controlling.” (citing Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin
Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944))).
51 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017). The
Heartland Court also noted that in Fourco, the Court also determined that “ ‘resides’ in the
recodified version . . . bore the same meaning as ‘inhabits.’ “ Id. (citing Fourco, 353 U.S. at
226).
52 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 912 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
53 Id.
54 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
55 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1579.
56 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102
Stat. 4669 (emphasis added).
57 See VE Holding, 917 F.2d 1574.
58 Id. at 1579 (“Section 1391(c) as it was in Fourco is no longer.”).
59 Id. at 1575 (“This is a case of first impression.”).
49
50
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amendment to the general venue provision.60 VE Holding arose from a dispute
between two competitors about the patentability of agricultural tools.61 Plaintiff
VE Holding Corporation filed suit against California Pellet Mill Company and
Johnson Gas Appliance Company62 in the Northern District of California,
alleging patent infringement and inducement to infringe. Defendant Johnson
moved to dismiss, arguing that, as an Iowa corporation with no regular and
established place of business in the Northern District of California, venue was
improper there.63 While the district court in California rejected defendant’s
arguments, the Federal Circuit found that Congress would have made its
intentions explicit if it had intended § 1400(b) to be excepted from the 1988
amendment.64 The Federal Circuit found instead that § 1391(c) now indicated
“a clear intention” that the general statute “expressly read[ ] itself into the specific
statute” of § 1400(b) in order to “define a term,” rather than supplant the specific
patent statute entirely.65 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that “the precedential
status of Fourco was no more.”66 With the freedom to establish the parameters
of this “matter of first impression,”67 the Federal Circuit in VE Holding ultimately
determined that the test for venue in patent infringement suits “is whether the
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction” under § 1391, as is the case in
any other civil litigation.68
3. The Venue Act. Courts generally applied VE Holding in patent infringement
suits until the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland.69 Importantly, this trend
continued even after a second amendment to the general venue provision. In
2011, Congress passed the Venue Act, which added a preface to § 1391(a) stating

Id.
Id. at 1576.
62 Plaintiff ultimately filed two suits. In VE Holding I, plaintiff sued both California Pellet
Mill and Johnson Gas Appliance. In VE Holding II, plaintiff filed suit against Johnson alone.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1579 (“Congress could readily have added ‘except for section 1400(b),’ if that
exception, which we can presume was well known to the Congress, was intended to be
maintained. Certainly it would not be sensible to require Congress to say, ‘For purposes of this
chapter, and we mean everything in this chapter.’ “) (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 1580.
66 Id. at 1579.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1584.
69 See, e.g., Price v. Code-Alarm, Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 WL 134188 (N.D. Ill. July 16,
1991); Meteoro Amusement Corp. v. Six Flags, 267 F. Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); SanofiAventis v. Synthon Holding BV, No. 1:07cv86, 2008 WL 819295, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 20,
2008); Imageware Sys., Inc. v. WCC Servs. US, Inc., No. 13cv309 DMS (JMA), 2013 WL
12097556 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2013).
60
61
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that the section only applied “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.”70
Nevertheless, district courts found that this so-called “saving clause”71 did not
“undermine the conclusion”72 in VE Holding. Instead, courts interpreted the
altered language to be “even broader than the language it replaced” because the
updated language was applicable to all venue statutes, not just venue statutes
under title twenty-eight of the U.S. Code.73
C. AT THE HEART OF IT

Six years after Congress passed the Venue Act, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments regarding § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) for the first time since its 1957
Fourco decision,74 and on May 22, 2017, the Court published its decision in TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.75
1. The Supreme Court in TC Heartland. TC Heartland arose in the context of a
dispute between competitors who both manufacture flavored drink mixes.76 TC
Heartland is an Indiana company headquartered in Indiana; although it “is not
registered to conduct business in Delaware and has no meaningful local presence
there,” TC Heartland was sued by Kraft in a Delaware district court because of
its shipment of the alleged infringing products into the state.77 The district court
rejected TC Heartland’s argument that it neither resided in Delaware nor had a
regular and established place of business there, and the Federal Circuit denied
TC Heartland’s petition for writ of mandamus, both courts citing the flexible

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2016).
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017).
72 Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 933 (E.D. Tex. 2016)
(“[T]he analysis in VE Holding is just as applicable to the post-2011 version of the venue statute
as it was to the pre-2011 version.”) Id. at 934; see also TeleSign Corp. v. Twilio, Inc., No. CV
15-3240 PSG (Ssx), 2015 WL 12765482, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) (“The
Court . . . declines to hold that VE Holdings is no longer good law.”).
73 Script Sec. Sols., 170 F. Supp. 3d at *934 (“The 1988 version of section 1391(c) made its
provisions applicable ‘[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter,’ while the 2011 version of
section 1391 makes its provisions applicable ‘[f]or all venue purposes.’ “) (emphasis added).
74 Keith Grady & Karen Morris, Denying TC Heartland Changed the Law on Venue Ignores Reality,
IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/08/denying-tcheartland-changed-law-venue-ignores-reality/id=88227/.
75 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
76 Id. at 1517. Note that although neither entity is incorporated, respondent alleged the
competitors were corporations in its complaint and petitioner admitted this allegation in its
answer. As a result, this Note, like the Court, does not address the question of whether
§ 1400(b) applies to unincorporated entities.
77 Id.
70
71
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venue landscape from VE Holding.78 The Federal Circuit found that VE Holding
“firmly resolved” any confusion regarding patent venue and refused to
reconsider this “settled precedent for over 25 years.”79 The Federal Circuit also
rejected TC Heartland’s claim that the 2011 amendments overruled VE Holding
and re-codified Fourco by arguing that “there was no established governing
Supreme Court common law” to codify after the 1988 amendment to § 1391.80
TC Heartland petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to determine whether
the 2011 amendments meant that § 1391(c) supplemented § 1400(b).81
The Supreme Court found that the Venue Act did not alter the scope of the
patent venue statute for two reasons. First, the Court relied on a 1966 case, Pure
Oil Co v. Suarez,82 to find that the shift in § 1391’s language from “for venue
purposes” to encompass “all venue purposes” made no material difference “to
the already comprehensive provision.”83 Second, the Court found that the
addition of the savings clause to § 1391 solidified the Court’s position as to
Congressional intent.84 Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s belief that the savings
clause made the general venue statute “even broader,”85 the Supreme Court
found that the clause “expressly state[d]” that some venue provisions are exempt
from the default definition of residence if they provide their own distinct
definition.86 Because the Court had found that § 1391 did not govern in Fourco,
even when the statute contained no exceptions, the Court reasoned that the
savings clause meant the Fourco holding “rest[ed] on even firmer footing now . . .
“87
In the short, eight-page opinion, the Court makes one final observation: it
dismisses TC Heartland’s argument that the 2011 amendment ratified the Federal
Circuit’s VE Holding opinion.88 Instead, the Court directly contradicts the
Federal Circuit, noting that the lower court relied “heavily” on the 1988
78 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 5613160,
at *1–2 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015); In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
rev’d sub nom, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
79 In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1341
80 Id. at 1341–42.
81 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1521.
82 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
83 TC Heartland, 137 S.Ct. at 1520 (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204–05
(1966)) (In Pure Oil, the Court found that the phrase “for venue purposes” cover[ed] “all venue
statutes.”).
84 Id. at 1521 (“This particular argument is even weaker . . . because the current provision
includes a saving clause expressly stating that it does not apply when ‘otherwise provided by
law.’ “).
85 Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 934 (2016).
86 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1521.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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amendment that specified that the general venue statute applied to provisions
“under this chapter.”89 Congress eliminated this language in 2011, which the
Supreme Court found indicative of Congressional intent to distance the statute
from its 1988 formulation and realign its interpretation with the Fourco-era text.90
In short, the TC Heartland Court determined that because “nothing in the text”
indicates Congress intended to approve VE Holding, the sixty-five-year-old
decision in Fourco remained binding precedent and venue was improper for TC
Heartland in Delaware.91
2. Judge Gilstrap’s ‘Rocket Docket.’ Following the Court’s TC Heartland decision,
patent case filings shifted dramatically. Prior to the ruling, thirty-six percent of
patent cases filed in the U.S. in 2016 were brought in the Eastern District of
Texas,92 where Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District heard almost one
out of every four patent venue suits filed nationwide. 93 Known as the “Rocket
Docket,” Texas’ Eastern District “actively cultivate[d], or at least tolerate[d], an
image as the go-to jurisdiction” 94 for patent trolls.95 In the first six weeks after
TC Heartland, however, just fourteen percent of cases were filed there;96 instead,
the District of Delaware (where, as of 2016, almost sixty-seven percent of U.S.
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated97) saw a nearly sixteen-percent jump in
case filings, followed by an increase in case filings in Silicon Valley’s Central and
Northern Districts of California.98 For patent trolls, filing in the district of
Delaware under the first prong of § 1400(b) presented an “obvious workaround”
to the uncertainty created by TC Heartland because “patent suits there typically
rule in favor of” those entities.99

Id. (quoting § 1391(c) (1988 ed.)).
Id.
91 Id.
92 Benjamin Anger & Boris Zelkind, Where Plaintiffs Are Filing Suit Post-TC Heartland,
LAW360 (July 7, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/942115/whereplaintiffs-are-filing-suit-post-tc-heartland.
93 Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the
Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
94 Id. at 3–4.
95 Id. Patent trolls are “companies formed solely for the purpose of monetizing patent rights
through litigation, often using methods that seem to leverage the costs and burdens of
litigation more so than the value of the patented technology.” Id. at 3.
96 Anger & Zelkind, supra note 92.
97 Delaware Division of Corporations, 2016 Annual Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/
2016AnnualReport.pdf.
98 Anger & Zelkind, supra note 92. The leap in California filings can be attributed to the
high volume of technology companies headquartered in Silicon Valley. Id.
99 Robert Stoll, What Changes Result from the Supreme Court Decision in TC Heartland?,
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/06/changes-resultsupreme-court-decision-tc-heartland/id=87612/.
89
90
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Nevertheless, high “court congestion” in Delaware led to additional difficulty
for patent infringement litigants.100 Down to only two active judges, Delaware
courts resorted to “lobbing cases to other courts, mean[ing that] patent holders
who want to keep their infringement lawsuits in that court are facing new
uncertainty.”101 As an alternative, patent plaintiffs began filing suit under the
previously under-utilized second prong of § 1400 (b), which permits an assertion
of venue anywhere the defendant has committed “acts of infringement and has
a regular and established place of business.”102 It is under the second prong of
§ 1400 that Judge Rodney Gilstrap reasserted the Eastern District of Texas’s
relevance as a haven for patent infringement plaintiffs.103
3. The Federal Circuit in Raytheon v. Cray. On June 29, 2017, the Eastern
District of Texas considered residency for venue purposes in Raytheon Co. v. Cray,
Inc.104 Raytheon alleged that Cray infringed on its four computer-related patents
by selling computers to customers in Texas and inducing others to use the
products.105 Because Cray is incorporated in the State of Washington, the
Eastern District quickly dismissed venue under the first prong of § 1400(b)106
before considering whether Cray had committed “acts of infringement” in the
district and whether Cray had a regular and established place of business there.107
The court determined that Cray had commitment acts of infringement based
on two allegations by Raytheon: (1) Cray induced patent infringement by
supercomputer users in the Eastern District; and (2) Cray infringed on
Raytheon’s patent when a Cray employee offered to sell a supercomputer while
working in the Eastern District.108 Finding these allegations sufficient to
constitute acts of infringement for the purposes of establishing proper venue,
the Eastern District then considered whether Cray had a regular and established
place of business in the district.109 The district court lamented the Supreme
Court’s failure in TC Heartland to clear up a circuit split regarding what constitutes
a regular and established place of business:110 While some courts have
traditionally required a “physical presence in the district” for the place of
100 Malathi Nayak, Swelling Docket Pushing Delaware Judges to Transfer Patent Cases, 86 USLW
(BNA) No. 11 (Sept. 28, 2017).
101 Id.
102 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016).
103 See Stoll, supra note 99.
104 258 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2017), mandamus granted, order vacated, sub nom, In Re Cray
Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
105 Id. at 784
106 Id. at 788.
107 Id. at 788–99.
108 Id. at 789–90.
109 Id. at 792.
110 Id.
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business to be regular and established,111 others have historically been less
strict.112 Without Supreme Court precedent to rely on, the Eastern District relied
on a 1985 Federal Circuit opinion, In re Cordis Corp.113 to find that a single
employee in the Eastern District was sufficient to constitute a regular and
established place of business.114
In Cordis, a Minnesota corporation filed a patent infringement suit in
Minnesota against a Florida corporation.115 The defendant had two full-time
sales representatives based in Minnesota and hired a Minnesota secretarial service
to receive Cordis’s goods and messages, but alleged that it did not have a regular
and established place of business because it was not registered to do business in
Minnesota, did not have a bank account there, and did not lease or own any
property in the state.116 The Federal Circuit found those contacts were
insufficient to warrant granting petitioner’s writ of mandamus, declaring that
“the appropriate inquiry” is whether Cordis has a “permanent and continuous
presence,” not whether the corporation has a “fixed physical presence.”117
Because the Eastern District in Cray viewed the Cray employee’s activities as
“factually similar” to those in In re Cordis, the Eastern District applied the
permanent-and-continuous analysis and found that the employee’s exclusive
contract as a sales executive working full-time within the Eastern District with
the “administrative support” from Cray satisfied the “regular and established
place of business” condition.118
To clarify Cordis and “adapt[ ] . . . to the modern era,” the court in Raytheon v.
Cray also enumerated four factors intended to act as “guideposts” in a “tailored
‘totality of the circumstances’ approach”: (1) defendant’s physical presence (for
instance through a retail store or warehouse); (2) defendant’s representations
(that it has a presence, whether internally or externally); (3) benefits received by
defendant from its presence in the district (with sales revenue being relevant but

111 Id. (citing Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 854 (4th Cir. 1961); Gen Radio Co.
v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 951 (1st Cir. 1961); Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752, 756
(9th Cir. 1941); Warner-Lambert Co. v. C.B. Fleet Co., 583 F. Supp. 519, 522 (D.N.J. 1984);
Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., Inc. 247 F. Supp. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
112 Id. (citing various degrees of austerity in Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co.,
184 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412,
1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs., Inc., No. 76 C 4340,
1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977); Shelter-Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp.
189, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1973)).
113 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
114 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 794.
115 Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734.
116 Id. at 735.
117 Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 793–794.
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not essential); and (4) defendant’s targeted interactions with the district.119 These
factors, enumerated by Judge Randy Gilstrap in the Eastern District, became
known as the “Gilstrap test” and temporarily “grant[ed patent plaintiffs] a
lifeline”120 by making it easier to predict and litigate suits against generic patent
infringers.
Relief was short-lived, however, for the Federal Circuit granted Cray’s
petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Cray Inc. and ordered Judge Gilstrap to
transfer the case to the Western District of Wisconsin. 121 The Federal Circuit
found that the Eastern District “misunderstood the scope and effect” of Cordis122
and determined that the four-factor Gilstrap test was “[in]sufficiently tethered”
to the statute’s language because it (1) inappropriately expanded the physical
location requirement, (2) overlooked the requisite regularity for a place of
business, and (3) mistakenly relied on an employee’s place of business rather than
a place established by the business itself.123 Instead, the Federal Circuit found
that three requirements are necessary to find that a defendant had a “regular and
established place of business” in the district: “(1) there must be a physical place
in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3)
it must be the place of the defendant. If any statutory requirement is not
satisfied, venue is improper . . . “124 In doing so, the Federal Circuit created a
third requirement for venue in patent infringement suits: “the ‘place’ . . . must be
that of the defendant,” not their employee.125 The Federal Circuit justified this
more narrow interpretation of § 1400(b) by arguing that the statute was designed
to be a “restrictive measure”126 that “g[ave] original jurisdiction to the court
where [only] a permanent agency transacting the business is located”127 in order to
“eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ “ by other venue statutes.128 The Federal
Circuit concluded its opinion by noting that “no one fact is controlling,”129 but
most industry experts have proffered that “the Federal Circuit put a ‘nail in the

Id. at 796–99.
Stoll, supra note 99.
121 871 F.3d 1355, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
122 Id. at 1359 (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
123 Id. at 1362–63.
124 Id. at 1360. Contrast this approach with that of Judge Gilstrap, who applied a totality of
the circumstances analysis that required consideration of “other realities present in individual
cases,” in order to avoid “the siren call of bright line rules.” Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799.
See also Doyle, supra note 30.
125 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
126 Id. (quoting Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 66 (1942)).
127 Id. at 1361 (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Lacey) (emphasis
added).
128 Id. (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 (1961)).
129 Id. at 1366.
119
120
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coffin on forum shopping in patent cases’ “ when it overturned the Gilstrap
test.130
Ultimately, Cray did not help its employee select a location for his home and
Cray did not store materials at the home; as a result, the Federal Circuit refused
to find that Cray’s employee’s home satisfied the third “place of the defendant”
element.131 The Federal Circuit’s more narrow interpretation of the statute
mimics the Supreme Court’s “textualist interpretation”132 in TC Heartland,
eliminating much of the uncertainty that abounded after the Supreme Court’s
May Heartland ruling133 and aligning the approaches to patent venue suits in the
two courts.134
D. IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL CONTEXT

Through Cray, the Federal Circuit clarified confusion for district courts
caught in the back-and-forth between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
over the scope of the patent venue provision.135 Nevertheless, because the
Hatch-Waxman Act creates a “unique posture”136 for litigants, application of TC
Heartland in pharmaceutical patent suits remains uncertain.
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act. Passed in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act137 was
adopted in order to address a “pharmaceutical marketplace dominated by
130 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Attorneys weigh in on impact of Federal Circuit patent venue ruling, WL
INTELL. PROP. DAILY BRIEFING, 2017 WL 4295782 (Sept. 28, 2017) (quoting interview with
Jeremy Elman, Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney).
131 Id. at 1363.
132 Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping & Patent Law—A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 141, 141 (2017).
133 See Bart Rankin & Yoon Chae, Federal Circuit Provides Standard for Interpreting ‘Regular and
Established Place of Business’ for Patent Venue, BAKER MCKENZIE (Sept. 26, 2017),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/09/standard-patent-venue/
(“The Federal Circuit’s Cray decision . . . provides needed guidance.”).
134 See Jonathan D.J. Loeb et al., Federal Circuit Brings More Clarity to Rules Governing Proper
Venue for Patent Cases, DECHERT LLP (Sept. 2017), https://info.dechert.com/10/9377/
september-2017/federal-circuit-court-brings-more-clarity-to-rules-governing-proper-venuefor-patent-cases.asp?sid=1a6e94cf-966c-490e-b720-7359884fc294# (finding that “recent
rulings from the Supreme Court (TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514 (2017)) and the Federal Circuit (In re Cray Inc., No. 2017-129) are making it easier for
defendants to escape the Eastern District for friendlier venues”).
135 The Cray decision is binding on district courts because, “in matters unique to patent law,
[the Federal Circuit] applies its own law . . . [t]hus, Federal Circuit law, rather than regional
circuit law, governs [the] analysis of what § 1400(b) requires.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
136 Ondrick, supra note 27.
137 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Its common name, the Hatch-Waxman Act, is
derived from the original sponsors of the bill as introduced in Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch
and Representative Henry Waxman.
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expensive brand-name drugs despite their patent protection having lapsed.”138
The goal of the Act during implementation was two-fold:139 it aimed to
incentivize branded pharmaceutical manufacturers to create new drugs and
expedite the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of generic drugs,
which are “therapeutically equivalent to brand-name products” but are also far
less expensive to produce and to purchase.140
For brand-name manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants innovative
products five years of exclusive market control following FDA approval.141 For
generics, the Hatch-Waxman Act established the Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) process, under which generic manufacturers can make one
of four claims about the patented drug at issue.142 The last of these claims,
known as a “Paragraph IV” certification,143 allows generic drug manufacturers
to request expedited approval of the generic drug by asserting that the branded
drug either has an “invalid” patent or its patent “will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug.”144 The first generic drug
manufacturer to successfully challenge a brand-name manufacturer’s patent
receives a six-month period of market exclusivity.145 However, generic
challengers must notify the branded manufacturer of their ANDA upon making
a Paragraph IV certification, and brand-name pharmaceutical companies are then
given forty-five days to file a patent infringement suit.146 If the branded
manufacturer files suit, the FDA will wait thirty months before granting final
approval of the ANDA filer’s application.147

138 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a ReDesigned Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 295 (2015).
139 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that HatchWaxman “aimed to strike a balance between . . . induc[ing] name-brand
pharmaceutical[s] . . . to develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling
competitors to [make] cheaper, generic copies” (quoting aaiPhrma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d
227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002))).
140 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 295.
141 Id. at 305.
142 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586 (1984) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)).
143 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 305.
144 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586 (1984) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)).
145 See Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 304 (“The Act afforded a six-month period of market
exclusivity to the first generic manufacturer to certify that the . . . brand-name manufacturer’s
patents were invalid or not infringed.”).
146 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (1984) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)). For this reason, brand-name manufacturers are generally the
plaintiffs in patent infringement suits.
147 Id. at 1594.
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Prior to TC Heartland, branded manufacturers who filed suit within the fortyfive-day deadline were able to do so in a number of different jurisdictions,
including filing multiple Hatch-Waxman claims against separate ANDA filers in
a single jurisdiction.148 This flexibility was made possible by a 2016 Federal
Circuit opinion, Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,149 where the
court found that a generic drug company in a Hatch-Waxman suit was subject to
personal jurisdiction anywhere the company intended to market its product.150
2. The Federal Circuit in Acorda Therapeutics. In Acorda, plaintiff Acorda
Therapeutics filed suit in the District of Delaware alleging that generic
manufacturer Mylan infringed on its patents when Mylan applied for FDA
approval to market its generic versions of drugs Ampyra®, Onglyza®, and
Kombiglyze.™151 Though Mylan is incorporated in West Virginia and prepared
and submitted its ANDA filings in West Virginia, Mylan also made the “costly,
significant step of applying to the FDA for approval to engage in future
activities . . . that will be purposefully directed at Delaware.”152 Because of the
“close connection” between an ANDA filing and future minimum contacts, the
Acorda court determined Mylan’s ANDA filing to be a “concrete, non-artificial
act[ ] of infringement” because it was “tightly tied, in purpose and planned effect,
to the deliberate making of sales in Delaware.”153 Thus, the court found Mylan
was subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.154
The Acorda court’s personal jurisdiction analysis is “intimately related to” the
§ 1400(b) patent venue analysis because, prior to TC Heartland, venue was proper
anywhere the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.155 With venue
proper wherever the generic manufacturer had minimum contacts, and minimum
contacts satisfied by “planned, non-speculative harmful conduct before it
occurs,”156 branded pharmaceuticals after Acorda could file a patent infringement
suit essentially “nationwide.”157 Doing so disadvantaged generic drug

Ainsworth, supra note 20.
817 F.3d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017).
150 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at
*8 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
151 Acorda, 817 F.3d at 757. (Acorda markets Ampyra®, and AstraZeneca markets Onglyza®
and Kombiglyze™; AstraZeneca also sued Mylan separately. Id. at 757–58.)
152 Id. at 759.
153 Id. at 760.
154 Id. at 764.
155 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at n.6 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign
Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
156 Acorda, 817 F.3d at 762 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
157 Colleen Tracy James & Manuel J. Velez, TC Heartland May Cause Protective Suits In ANDA
Cases, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/903700/tcheartland-may-cause-protective-suits-in-anda-cases.
148
149
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manufacturers who made a “conscious decision not to have a presence”158 in a
particular jurisdiction like Delaware, which is historically patentee-friendly.159 In
“burden[ing] unnecessarily”160 these generic manufacturers, the Federal Circuit’s
2016 decision in Acorda disturbed the balance between the interests of brandname and generic drug manufacturers in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
TC Heartland re-jiggered the Hatch-Waxman balancing act once again.
Though the Federal Circuit later provided some clarity for patent litigants in Cray,
application of the statute in the context of a Hatch-Waxman suit requires
additional analysis. Part III of this Note considers the implications for both
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and their generic manufacturers of the
2017 changes in the statutory interpretation of the patent venue statute.
III. ANALYSIS
A. CRAY-ZINESS FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

While the Cray decision generally calmed the waters of patent infringement
suits after the Federal Circuit made the decision to bend the knee 161 to the
Supreme Court’s textual interpretation, in the pharmaceutical industry, no higher
court has yet resolved the confusion among district courts in how to interpret
prong two of § 1400(b) for Hatch-Waxman litigants. In the first suit to consider
the issue, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc.,162 the District of Delaware
considered what constituted a future act of infringement and a regular and
established place of business for a Hatch-Waxman litigant.163
1. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Mylan. In Bristol-Myers, plaintiffs Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. and Pfizer Co. brought suit in Delaware alleging that Mylan [MPI], a
West Virginia company, infringed upon its patented drug when it submitted an
ANDA to the FDA.164 While MPI was registered with the Delaware Board of
Pharmacy, the corporation did not have any real property, addresses, or
employees in Delaware.165 Bristol-Myers Squibb nevertheless argued MPI’s

Ainsworth, supra note 20.
Love, supra note 93, at 1.
160 See Brief for The Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Mylan’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 10, Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817
F.3d 755 (2016) (No. 15-1456, 15-1460).
161 “[W]hen your enemies defy you, you must serve them steel and fire. When they go to
their knees, however, you must help them back to their feet. Elsewise no man will ever bend
the knee to you.” GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A STORM OF SWORDS 122 (Bantam 2013).
162 No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
163 Id.
164 Id. at *1–2.
165 Id. at *2.
158
159
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ANDA filing constituted an act of infringement and argued the corporation had
a regular and established place of business in the district.166
The Bristol-Myers court, like the VE Holding court, began its analysis by noting
that the issue is one of “first impression”; no court prior to Bristol-Myers has been
forced to interpret the second prong of § 1400(b) in the Hatch-Waxman
context.167 The court then addressed the first half of the second prong of
§ 1400(b): what constitutes an act of infringement in Hatch-Waxman suits?168
Looking to the text of the statute, the court found it dispositive that Congress
chose to use the present perfect tense in § 1400(b) when referring to acts of
infringement by asking where the defendant “has committed” these acts.”169 For
Hatch-Waxman patent litigants, this choice of language creates “an almost
impenetrable problem” because a Hatch-Waxman suit is focused on acts where
the defendant “will” manufacture, sell, or offer to sell a product “in the
future,”170 while § 1400(b) is focused on acts that have already been
committed.171 In other words, it is problematic that “the temporal focus of the
Hatch-Waxman infringement analysis is in the future, not—as is true in
essentially all other patent infringement suits—the past, or even the present.172
One particularly complicated facet of this “temporal mismatch” is the safe
harbor provision of § 271(e), under which a generic drug manufacturer that
might otherwise have committed patent infringement is saved from litigation if
the act(s) of infringement are “reasonably related” to an ANDA filing.173 In
doing so, the safe harbor provision protects generic drug companies from patent
infringement suits if they have submitted, or plan to submit, an ANDA filing. 174
As a result, “historical conduct that constitutes patent infringement in a typical
patent lawsuit is expressly and statutorily deemed non-infringing in the context
of Hatch-Waxman litigation.”175

Id.
Id. at *6.
168 Id.
169 “The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of analyzing ‘Congress’ choice of
verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.’ “ Id. at *6 (quoting Carr v. United States,
560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010)).
170 Id. See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding that the defendant’s “ANDA filings constitute formal acts that reliably indicate plans
to engage in marketing of the proposed generic drug”).
171 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *6.
172 Id. (citing Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 760 (Fed. Cir.
2016)) (emphasis in original).
173 Id. at *7 (citing 353 U.S.C. § 271(e)(i) and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005)).
174 Id.
175 Id.
166
167
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Though Hatch-Waxman litigants are expressly protected from backwardlooking litigation, § 271(e) allows for the creation of a “ ‘highly artificial act of
infringement’ [to] precipitate[ ] litigation . . . for the express purpose of resolving
patent disputes before a generic drug product is launched.”176 Under § 271(e)(2),
generic drug companies commit an act of infringement if they file an ANDA that
“seeks approval [of a generic bioequivalent drug] before the expiration of a
patent covering the branded drug.”177 This “particularized framework” acts as a
“stand-in” in order to “move [the infringement] forward in time” and in doing
so resolves the “complete mismatch” between § 1400(b) and § 271(e).178
In Bristol-Myers, the court found that the “acts of infringement” requirement
in § 1400(b) was satisfied by MPI’s submission of an ANDA filing because
“MPI’s ‘ANDA filings are tightly tied, in purpose and planned effect, to the
deliberate making of sales in Delaware.’ “179 In other words, although MPI had
not yet infringed on the Bristol-Myers Squibb patent, the Bristol-Myers court
found the ANDA filing sufficient as an artificial act of infringement, and if the
FDA approved the generic drug product, it would do so.
After establishing that § 271(e)(2) created a run-around to satisfy the act of
infringement requirement in § 1400(b), the Bristol-Myers court considered
whether MPI had a “regular and established place of business” in Delaware.180
To start, the Delaware district court analyzed the “regular and established place
of business” language in § 1400(b) using “ ‘clear and specific’ “ guidance
provided by the Supreme Court over fifty years ago.181 Under that interpretation,
the Bristol-Myers court found that “[t]he words of the statute . . . require[]: a (i)
place of business that is (ii) regular and (iii) established.”182 Aiding in the court’s
understanding of the statute’s text was “the Federal Circuit’s 1985 decision in In
re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 733, which mark[ed] the most recent, precedential case
applying the ‘regular and established place of business’ prong of § 1400(b).”183
The Bristol-Myers court found that the reasoning in In re Cordis applied to the facts
at bar and maintained that a “place of business” must have a “meaningful
physical manifestation” like “a place authorized by the defendant where some
part of the defendant’s business is done.”184
176 Id. at *7–8 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990)) (emphasis
in original).
177 Id. at 7.
178 Id. at 6–8.
179 Id. at *9 (quoting Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)).
180 Id. at *1
181 Id. at *14 (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 262, 62 (1961)).
182 Id.
183 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *14.
184 Id. at *14–15.
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Ultimately, however, Judge Stark found that Mylan’s unique status as a
generic manufacturer meant that additional venue-related discovery was required
in order to determine whether MPI satisfied the Cordis test, leaving district courts
uncertain as to what would satisfy the “regular and established” prong of
§ 1400(b).185 Ten days later, the Federal Circuit would distinguish Cordis in its
Cray decision, creating new appellate court guidance based on three similar, but
not identical, statutory elements: whether there is “(1) a physical place in the
district; (2) . . . a regular and established place of business; and (3) . . . [a] place of
the defendant.”186 Nevertheless, Judge Stark’s comment that a company’s
“constant involvement in Hatch-Waxman litigation . . . must weigh into the
assessment of whether [a company] has a . . . regular and established place of
business”187 demonstrates that “there remains some uncertainty as to how the
district courts will specifically adopt the Cray standard”188 in Hatch-Waxman
suits.
2. Galderma Labs. The Northern District of Texas created further confusion
when, following Cray, Judge Barbara Lynn discussed Bristol-Myers in Galderma
Laboratories, L.P. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.189 and found “several issues
with the decision.”190 The Bristol-Myers court had utilized an ANDA filing as a
“stand-in”191 for an act of infringement in a Hatch-Waxman suit, but Judge Lynn
criticized the Bristol-Myers rationale as “inconsistent with the plain language” in
Hatch-Waxman, which “does not identify any act of infringement other than the
ANDA submission.”192 Referencing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray to
reject Judge Gilstrap’s test as “ ‘not sufficiently tethered’ to the statutory
language,”193 the Galderma court found it more appropriate to find venue proper
where the ANDA submission was prepared and submitted.194 As to the “regular
and established place of business” prong, the Galderma court applied the three
part test from Cray, requiring: “ ‘(1) a physical place in the district; (2) a regular

185 Id. at *18 (noting that “Mylan’s business model is in large part predicated upon
participating in a large amount of litigation, since almost all of the generic drugs Mylan seeks
to market in the U.S. are [generic] bioequivalent[s]”).
186 In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
187 Bristol-Myers, 2017 3980155, at *18.
188 Rankin, supra note 133.
189 No. 3:17-cv-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017).
190 Id. at *5.
191 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *8.
192 Galderma, 2017 WL 6505793, at *5.
193 Id. (quoting In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
194 Id. at *6 (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-cv-00948-LDD, 2009 WL 2843288, at
*3 n.5 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2009) (“ ‘[L]ocation of the preparation and submission of the ANDA’
is ‘the location of the injury’ for venue purposes in Hatch-Waxman Act cases.”)).
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and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.’
“195
3. Mallinckrodt and Javelin. The District of Delaware decided Bristol-Myers
just before the Federal Circuit’s Cray decision, while the Northern District of
Texas published Galderma two months later and cites the Cray decision directly
when criticizing the reasoning in Bristol-Myers.196 While it would appear that the
interpretation of § 1400(b) is converging around Cray, since Galderma and Cray,
the District of Delaware has issued multiple decisions further complicating the
analysis. In Javelin Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories Ltd.,197 Judge Stark
refused to follow Galderma in ruling that a corporate subsidiary could satisfy the
“place of the defendant” element of § 1400(b)’s second prong.198 Two weeks
later, however, Judge Stark contradicted his Bristol-Myers analysis in Mallinckrodt
IP v. B. Braud Medical Inc.,199 finding that “a courthouse is not a place ‘of the
defendant.’ “200 In short, application of TC Heartland in the pharmaceutical
industry, even after Cray, remains highly fluid.
B. MOVING BEYOND BRISTOL-MYERS AND GALDERMA LAB

As TC Heartland continues to cause confusion for pharmaceutical litigants,
branded pharmaceuticals are left wondering how best to proceed. Some industry
experts have advised pharmaceutical plaintiffs to file protective suits in order to
ensure that the company’s statutory thirty-month stay from generic competition
is protected.201 Others have advised brand-name drug manufacturers to apply

Id. at *7 (quoting In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Id. at *5 (arguing that “the Delaware court’s approach to venue in ANDA cases” is a
“liberal interpretation” that is “inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance”).
197 C.A. No. 16-224-LPS, 2017 WL 5953296, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2017).
198 Compare Javelin, 2017 WL 5953296, at *4 (“In the Court’s view, it follows from Cray that
the ‘place’ of a corporate affiliate or subsidiary of a named defendant may, in some
circumstances, and similar to the place of a defendant’s employee, be treated as a ‘place of the
defendant’ “), with Galderma, 2017 WL 6505793, at *8 (“A subsidiary’s presence in the district
cannot be imputed to the parent for venue purposes.”); See also Scott W. Doyle et al., December
11, 2017 – TC Heartland Weekly Update, FRIED FRANK LLP (Dec. 11, 2017),
http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7955.
199 No. 17-cv-0365, 2017 WL 6383610, at *1 (D. Del Dec. 14, 2017).
200 Id. at *7 (quoting In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). By contrast, in
Bristol-Myers, Judge Stark cited MPI’s appearance “in more than 100 cases in the District of
Delaware” and “constant involvement in Hatch-Waxman litigation” as a factor in the regular
and established place of business analysis. Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *18. See also
Doyle et al., December 26, 2017 – TC Heartland Weekly Update, FRIED FRANK LLP (Dec. 26,
2017), http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7966.
201 James, supra note 157.
195
196
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for consolidation of multiple suits against different ANDA filers through
multidistrict litigation.202
1. The Habit of Filing Protective Suits. Until the Acorda decision in 2016, many
Hatch-Waxman litigants filed “protective suits,” or suits filed “in the forum
where jurisdiction over the generic manufacturer is certain,” in order to continue
litigating the case “even if the first-filed action in the preferred forum is dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds.”203 Doing so was “protective” of a brand-name
plaintiff because it ensured that the thirty-month stay preventing an ANDA filer
from receiving FDA approval and competing against the branded manufacturer
remained in place. 204
In construing personal jurisdiction as broadly as it did, the court in Acorda
“reduce[d] or eliminate[d] the need for protective suits”205 because branded
pharmaceutical companies were no longer concerned about the court dismissing
their first-filed action. When TC Heartland was decided, however, it reinvigorated
these companies’ concern that their suit would be dismissed and their drug no
longer assured thirty months of protection from generic competition.
Although filing protective suits would ensure that pharmaceutical plaintiffs’
exclusivity will be preserved for thirty months, the procedural mechanism would
“increase the costs of litigating ANDA cases.”206 Furthermore, many U.S.
companies are incorporated in Delaware.207 Delaware courts are already
overloaded—the district is currently making do with only two active judges, two
vacancies, and a number of visiting judges, yet is faced with the onslaught of
patent infringement suits ferreted away from the Rocket Docket.208 Already,
Delaware courts have had to resort to punting cases outside of the district. 209
Filing protective suits in Delaware would overload Delaware courts even more
and could exacerbate issues of cost and uncertainty if the case was transferred
because of a lack of judicial resources.
2. Reliance on the Joint Panel for Multidistrict Litigation. A second solution to the
uncertainty of pharmaceutical patent venue was floated by the Bristol-Myers court
202 Patrick M. Arenz et al., Another Prediction About Patent Cases After TC Heartland: More
Multidistrict Litigation, 94 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 2325 (Sept. 1, 2017).
203 James, supra note 157.
204 As part of its ANDA approval process, the FDA will stay approval of a generic
bioequivalent for thirty months while litigation ensues. A protective suit ensures that this
thirty-month stay will continue, even if the action filed in plaintiff’s preferred forum is
dismissed. Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Delaware Division of Corporations, supra note 97.
208 Nayak, supra note 100.
209 Id. (finding that Delaware patent infringement complaints more than doubled between
May and August).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
NEWTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE)

280

10/2/2018 1:42 PM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 25:2

itself: relying on the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to “create more
Hatch-Waxman multidistrict litigations.”210 The Bristol-Myers court hinted at the
possibility of consolidating multiple cases against a single ANDA filer into
multidistrict litigations (“MDLs”) in response to concern about “the time and
expense that is required to resolve these cases.”211
Although MDLs were not commonly used for patent infringement suits prior
to TC Heartland,212 consolidation could lessen the burden on over-flooded
Delaware court dockets because “there will be at least some common issues of
discovery . . . similar claim construction issues, and likely related infringement
theories and invalidity defenses.”213
Nevertheless, the Bristol-Myers court found that relying on MDLs is not a
perfect solution because “the process of creating an MDL often involves
litigation (adding time and expense) and, even once created, cases are transferred
to an MDL only for pretrial purposes. They must be transferred back to the
transferor districts for trial, unless a party waives its right to be transferred
back.”214 In other words, the ease of consolidating patent infringement suits
based on common discovery issues may not warrant the time and expense of
MDLs. Furthermore, there are additional uncertainties associated with using
MDLs because: (1) “it is unclear exactly how many jurisdictions need to be
implicated to lead to an MDL transfer”; (2) “it is not clear where cases will go”;
(3) “there is a lack of clarity as to how similar the accused products must be to
warrant transfer”; and (4) “it remains to be seen which court is best suited and
most likely to preside over trials after the conclusion of MDL pretrial
proceedings.”215
Ultimately, MDLs, like protective suits, do not represent a particularly
appealing option for pharmaceutical plaintiffs in patent infringement suits
because they would increase the time and expense associated with litigation.

210 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, *1,
*12, n.17 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017).
211 Id.
212 See Arenz, supra note 202 (“To date, this tool has not been used extensively in patent
cases.”).
213 Id.
214 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12, n.17 (citations omitted).
215 Arenz, supra note 202.
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Instead, judges216 and industry experts217 have argued that Congressional action
is needed to update § 1400(b) for the modern era.
C. THE EFFICACY OF RELYING ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Members of Congress and others218 assert that legislative action is necessary
in order to resolve the uncertainty and inefficiency created by TC Heartland. For
instance, Representative Darrell Issa, House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee member and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet, said in a July 13, 2017 Committee hearing that Judge
Gilstrap’s attempt to circumvent TC Heartland in Raytheon v. Cray was
“reprehensible”219 and that his Subcommittee would consider new legislation
following the creation of the four-part test.220 The Federal Circuit’s later decision
to reject the Gilstrap test means that legislation on that particular issue is
unnecessary, but Chairman Issa’s comments are nonetheless indicative of the
general view that “patent reform is now a staple of Congress’s agenda.”221
Similarly, Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and
the Senate Republican High-Tech Task Force, indicated that patent venue

216 The Federal Circuit impliedly suggested Congressional action was needed when it noted
that the current patent venue language had not been updated for the modern era. Scott
Graham, Federal Circuit: No More Loosey-Goosey Rules on Patent Venue, LAW.COM (Sept. 21, 2017,
7:43 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/09/21/federal-circuit-no-moreloosey-goosey-rules-on-patent-venue/?slreturn=20180008085957 (citing In re Cray Inc., 871
F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (the court “recognize[s] that the world has changed . . . [b]ut,
notwithstanding these changes, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in TC
Heartland . . . we must focus on the full and unchanged language of the statute”)).
217 Matthew Bultman, Pharma Groups Urge Justices to Avoid Patent Venue Changes, LAW360 (Mar.
9, 2017, 8:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/900202/pharma-groups-urge-justicesto-avoid-patent-venue-changes.
218 See Alexander Poonai, Note, Hatch-Waxman in the Heartland: Achieving Fair Venue Reform in
Pharmaceutical Litigation, 27 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 103, 113 (2017) (noting that TC Heartland caused
a “pendulum [swing] in the opposite direction” away from the “broad discretion to sue” that
was previously afforded to “pioneer” (or branded) drug manufacturers). Poonai argues that
new legislation is necessary in order to “centralize the location of Paragraph IV disputes in
two locations: the Patent Trials and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) and the District of Maryland.”
Id. at 108.
219 The Impact of Bad Patents on American Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intell.
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (July 3, 2017) (statement of
Rep.
Darrell
Issa,
Member,
H.
Comm.
On
the
Judiciary),
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/impact-bad-patents-american-business/.
220 Stoll, supra note 99.
221 Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 330, 332-33 (2017).
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reform is a priority for the 115th Congress.222 While some argue that it is crucial
to “preserve the balance of power between pioneer and generic
manufacturers,”223 for the reasons discussed below, this Note argues that
Congressional reform of the patent system is neither a realistic nor a necessary
solution.
1. Congress’s First Attempt at Reform. The Federal Circuit anticipated
Congressional action in In re Cray, when Judge Lourie “recognize[d] that the
world has changed since 1985,” but felt bound by the “unchanged language of
the statute.”224 In doing so, the Cray court implicitly suggested that
Congressional action was needed in order to update the statutory language to fit
the modern era.225
In 2011, Congress attempted to adapt to the modern era by passing the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which has since been viewed as the
“most significant change to the U.S. patent system since” Fourco.226 Through the
AIA, Congress established Inter Partes Review (IPR), a mechanism for fasttracking patent litigation by limiting discovery in order to “improve patent quality
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”227 In an IPR
procedure, any party can petition the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) to review a patent; if that petition is granted, then the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board within the USPTO will determine whether the patent claim is
valid.228
Although the more efficient two-step IPR procedure provides a quicker
mechanism for contesting patent claims than cumbersome district court
litigation, IPR proceedings unwittingly created further uncertainty in the patent
litigation world because claims have historically been invalidated at a far higher
222 Orrin Hatch, Chairman, United States Senate Republican High-Tech Task Force,
Innovation Agenda for the 115th Congress (Feb. 16, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/2/hatch-unveils-innovation-agendafor-the-115th-congress).
223 Poonai, supra note 218, at 108.
224 In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Matthew J. Rizzolo et al.,
Federal Circuit Provides Guidance on Patent Venue Post TC Heartland, ROPES & GRAY LLP
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2017/09/Federal-CircuitProvides-Guidance-on-Patent-Venue-Post-TC-Heartland.aspx (“[T]he court’s ruling appears
to imply that any efforts by infringement plaintiffs to extend the patent venue statute to cover
virtual business locations are better addressed in Congress as opposed to the courts.”).
225 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359. See also Graham, supra note 216.
226 Renoj Zachariah, Fighting the Troll Toll: The Case for Judicial Review of the U.S.P.T.O. Director’s
Denial of a Petition to Institute an Inter Partes Review, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2275 (2017).
227 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011).
228 See Zachariah, supra note 226, at 2276–77 (explaining that “[i]f the petition is granted,
then, in the second step, the USPTO[ ] . . . will conduct an IPR proceeding and render a
patentability decision”).
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rate than in federal district courts.229 Thus, a claimant that files an IPR
proceeding is not guaranteed, or even reasonably reassured, that his or her claim
would pass muster in district court litigation. As a result, IPR proceedings,
although less expensive and more efficient, have not stemmed the influx of
litigants filing patent infringement suits. This begs the question: is another
attempt at reform necessary?
Some members of Congress believe so. Representative Issa has advanced
“the possibility of broad IPR reform, not to bring uncertainty, but to further
empower a system which is considered . . . to be good, but . . . not good
enough.”230
Even so, no reform attempt has yet been signed into law, though legislation
was introduced in both Houses of Congress.231 In February 2017, Senator Hatch
indicated that reform was imminent “this year,”232 but to patent infringement
plaintiffs, “it is becoming clear that protection from . . . Congress is not coming
any time soon.”233 On January 2, 2018, Senator Hatch announced his retirement
from the United States Senate.234
Legislative reforms of pharmaceutical industry have been particularly
lackluster. Lawmakers “have been resistant to making market-specific exclusions
or changes to patent law” despite any “increase[d] efficiency” because reforms
would be “politically challenging.”235 Redrafting the Hatch-Waxman Act to
“embrace the speculative, artificial, and delocalized nature of the current law,”
for instance, would require Congress to “take a second look at one of the best
legislative compromises it has produced in recent memory . . . “236 Compromise
in the current political climate is unlikely given the “contention, polarization and
antipathy that exists between the two major parties . . . “237 In short, Congress
229 Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict Between Hatch-Waxman and Inter Partes
Review, 6:1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 17 (2016).
230 Issa, supra note 219.
231 On June 21, 2017, Senator Christopher Coons introduced the STRONGER Patents Act
of 2017 to amend the patent infringement provisions in Section 271 and the Inter Partes
Review provisions in Section 316(a), but the bill has only three co-sponsors and has not been
considered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where it was referred following
introduction. The STRONGER Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong (2017).
232 Hatch, supra note 222.
233 Stoll, supra note 99.
234 Lisa Hagen, Hatch announces retirement from Senate, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2018, 2:09 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/367082-hatch-to-retire.
235 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 325–26.
236 Poonai, supra note 218, at 114, 122.
237 Ed Rendell, Opinion, Congress damaged its reputation, but it’s not too late for compromise, THE
HILL (Dec. 26, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/366435-congressdamaged-its-reputation-but-its-not-too-late-for-compromise. While Rendell, the former
Pennsylvania Governor, proposed how progress toward a legislative compromise might be
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needed “some help figuring out how to fix th[e] broken market”238 for
pharmaceutical litigants.
2. Is Another Attempt at Congressional Reform Needed? Should legislative reform
be attempted, proposals to amend Hatch-Waxman vary greatly. Some medical
professionals have posited that the FDA should fast-track approval of a single
generic bioequivalent drug when the price of its branded counterpart increases
quickly.239 By lowering regulation of the bioequivalent alternative, the fast-track
process would encourage competition in order to lower prices. Alternatively,
other experts argue that heightened government regulation is needed in order to
combat the rising costs of prescription drugs.240
Even if reform were politically and technically tenable, the question would
remain: should the patent venue statute be updated in order to make it easier for
branded pharmaceutical companies to sue their generic competitors? During
oral arguments prior to its TC Heartland ruling, the Supreme Court expressed
concern about the impact of its decision on the pharmaceutical industry: “What
do we do . . . about the — all of the cases, like the pharmaceutical cases that will
be upended and made completely impractical by ignoring 1391?”241
This Note nevertheless argues that although pharmaceutical patent
infringement cases were upended by TC Heartland, the result was not impractical.
The pharmaceutical industry is plagued by high drug prices, driven in large part
by a lack of competition from generic manufacturers. The TC Heartland decision
inadvertently provides an effective, albeit messy, fix to the problem of high drug
prices. Namely, the decision impacts drug manufacturers in two major ways: first,
it “spe[ ]d up . . . market entry for the generic”; second, it “provide[d] generic
companies with the ability to think strategically about their jurisdictional
choices.”242

reached, he lamented “the inability of Congress to work together in a bipartisan fashion to get
things done.” Id.
238 Matthew Herper, After the Martin Shkreli Circus, How Can We Fix Drug Pricing?, FORBES
(Feb. 4, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2016/02/04/hereare-some-solutions-to-the-martin-shkreli-problem/#78c6083bf799.
239 Jonathan D. Alpern et al., High-Cost Generic Drugs – Implications for Patients and Policymakers,
371 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1859–62 (2014). See also Herper, supra note 238 (arguing that “when a
dramatic price increase happens,” one possible solution would be to “allow the FDA to fasttrack any generic that comes along”).
240 See Weissmann, supra note 3 (“Some experts have suggested . . . [that] the only solution
to the rising cost of generics, especially for specialty drugs, is more direct government
regulation.”).
241 Tr. Of Oral Arg. at 54, In re TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
242 The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Implications for Hatch-Waxman Litigation, ARENT
FOX LLP (May 25, 2017), https://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/supreme-court’s-tcheartland-decision-implications-hatch-waxman-litigation.
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These changes alleviate one of the “fundamental flaws of American oversight
of the pharmaceutical industry,” which is the belief that “once [a drug company’s]
patents expire, competition from generics will drive down costs.”243 In theory,
this belief is sound.244 The FDA’s approval process has historically been so slow,
however, that it acts as a “barrier to market entry for new generic drug
manufacturers.”245
Thus, by imposing a new burden on plaintiffs filing patent infringement suits,
the Supreme Court did by accident what Congress had been attempting for
years—re-balance the competition between generic drug manufacturers and
branded pharmaceutical companies. The TC Heartland decision did disadvantage
branded pharmaceuticals, but it did so in a way that counteracted the habit of
those companies to “play the role of the ‘boy scout,’ [i.e.] agreeing to behave well
but doing it in a way that prevents further competition in the market.”246 In
short, TC Heartland eliminated the market advantage previously afforded to
branded pharmaceuticals by “drastically narrow[ing] the plaintiff’s choice of
forum” 247 and helping generic drug companies reassert some control over the
venue where they might be subject to suit.
To be sure, the solution provided by TC Heartland is imperfect. It is an
unorganized run-around to the complex Hatch-Waxman Act that fails to “create
a . . . centralized solution to the problem at hand.”248 The Supreme Court’s
decision does not ensure, for example, that generic drug companies will be
sufficiently incentivized to enter the market, nor does it help lower prices for
drugs where competition is already in place.249 In the absence of other viable
solutions, however, TC Heartland provides relief by encouraging, or at least
hampering the prevention of, generic entry into the market.

Weissmann, supra note 3.
See Jeremy A. Greene, Can the Government Stop the Next Martin Shkreli?, SLATE (Mar. 22,
2016,5:45AM),http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/03/
the_fda_wants_to_stop_the_next_martin_shkreli_by_speeding_up_the_approval.html (“If
the invisible hand was doing its job balancing supply and demand, any increase in price would
be met by a flood of new competitors entering the market.”).
245 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE:
PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY
PRICE INCREASES 1 (2016). The GAO report found that “competition could be increased if
FDA would approve more abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA), which would allow
generic drug manufacturers to market a drug, but there is a backlog at FDA.” Id. at 26.
246 ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES
AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 25 (Cambridge University Press 2017).
247 Poonai, supra note 218, at 113.
248 Poonai, supra note 218, at 114.
249 For a general discussion of the continued challenges faced after a barrier to competition
in the pharmaceutical industry is removed, see Greene, supra note 244.
243
244
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IV. CONCLUSION
Until TC Heartland, plaintiffs in patent infringement suits had ample flexibility
in deciding where to file suit against a generic competitor. TC Heartland vastly
limited this flexibility. But does it matter? The scope of TC Heartland itself is an
admittedly narrow “technical issue of statutory interpretation.”250 Nevertheless,
TC Heartland “attracted widespread public attention”251 for “implicat[ing]
substantial questions of patent policy and promis[ing] serious real-world
consequences affecting the future of patent litigation.”252 Though Cray provided
clarity, the pharmaceutical industry remains plagued by real-world uncertainty.
This Note argues that the confusion caused by the Supreme Court in TC
Heartland was a necessary chaos. By narrowing the number of jurisdictions where
a pharmaceutical company can file suit against a generic manufacturer, the
Supreme Court’s decision made it more difficult for patent infringement
plaintiffs to file suit against their generic competition. The ruling pushed back
against brand-name pharmaceutical companies attempting to exploit their
control of the market to raise drug prices and inadvertently re-balanced the
seesaw between branded pharmaceutical companies and generic drug
manufacturers that is at the “heart” of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

See Bone, supra note 132 at 141.
Id. More than thirty amicus briefs were filed by corporations, states, and individuals,
including one retired Chief Judge from the Federal Circuit and the state of Texas. Id.
252 Id. at 141.
250
251
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